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ABSTRACT Security is always an important issue in wireless communications. Physical layer encryp-
tion (PLE) is an effective way to enhance wireless communication security and prevent eavesdropping.
Rather than replacing cryptography at higher layers, PLE’s benefit is to enable using lightweight cryptosys-
tems or provide enhanced security at the signal level. The upper cryptography is faced with a noise-free
channel, and the processing object is bit data. In PLE, the effects of channel and noise can be exploited
to enhance security and prevent deciphering. In addition, since the processing object is complex vector
signals, there are more operational functions to select and design for PLE. The mathematical models,
design frameworks, and cryptographic primitives of PLE are established. Two design frameworks are
proposed: stream PLE and block PLE. For stream PLE, a new 3D security constellation mapping is
derived. For block PLE, two types of sub-transforms are defined: isometry transformations and stochastic
transformations. Furthermore, a practical system operation mode PLE-block chaining (PBC) is proposed to
enhance the practical system security. The proposed PLE framework can resist known plaintext attacks and
chosen-plaintext attacks. The simulation shows that the proposed isometry transformation method has good
performances in terms of bit error ratio (BER) penalty and confusion degree.
INDEX TERMS Physical layer encryption, block PLE, stream PLE, isometry transformation, stochastic
transformation, PLE-block chaining.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a serious problem in wireless communication sys-
tems due to the broadcast characteristics of wireless channels.
In Shannon’s pioneering work [1], security and reliability
are considered and designed together. However, with the
development of modern cryptography, security has become
a research direction separate from communication design.
While modern cryptography considers the encryption prob-
lem in error-free channels, communication system design
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Prakasam Periasamy.
considers transmission reliability and effectiveness. In a prac-
tical communication systems, such as the fourth-generation
(4G) cellular standard and wireless LAN communication, the
physical layer and the security layer are designed separately
and so do not have much overlap with each other.
The emergence of physical layer security (PLE) tech-
nology combines the communication physical layer and
the security layer. Wyner’s original research took into
account the secure transmission issues in noisy channels [2].
We call this information-theoretic security. This is a dif-
ferent way from up-layer cryptography. After Wyner’s
work, important research about PLS has been carried
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out, including multi-antenna beamforming [3]–[5], artifi-
cial noise techniques [6]–[9], and cooperative interference
techniques [10], to name but a few. Over the last two decades,
researchers have developed a significant number of mathe-
matical theories, technologies, algorithms, and solutions for
information theory based PHY-security challenges. Based
on information theory, PLS is designed to achieve security
through secure coding which does not require keys. The prob-
lem faced by PLS is that it depends on the channel. When the
security capacity is zero, that is, the eavesdropping channel
is better than the legal channel, or if the eavesdropping chan-
nel is unknown, security cannot be guaranteed. Therefore,
it is necessary to find other ways to enhance security at the
physical layer.
Unlike the above PLS works, physical layer encryp-
tion (PLE) is another way to achieve security at the physical
layer. PLE is a kind of security based on computational com-
plexity, which needs to distribute keys on both the transmitter
and receiver. The PLE system has no strict requirements
on the number of antennas or channel conditions, and thus
is more practical and can be applied to various types of
wireless communication systems. Compared with traditional
cryptography (that only considers perfect channels) it can
take advantage of the effects of the channel and noise and
provide security at the signal level rather than at the bit level.
Rather than replacing cryptography at higher layers, one
of PLE’s benefits is to enable using lightweight cryptosys-
tems, an important issue in devices with limited resources.
Researchers considered PLE in a variety of communica-
tion systems including OFDM systems [11], [12], massive
MIMO systems [13]–[15], Untrusted Relaying Systems [16],
IEEE 802.15.4 protocols [17], rateless codes [18] and sparse
code multiple access (SCMA) [19]. The work in [17] imple-
mented a PLE system in ASIC and FPGA with low complex-
ity and latency.
In general, the PLE technology has the following advan-
tages:
1. Compared to PLS, PLE does not depend on the eaves-
dropper channel conditions. Even if eavesdroppers havemore
antennas and stronger reception capabilities, PLE can still
guarantee secure transmission.
2. PLE has the characteristics of low latency. It also
has low computational cost, so that the power consump-
tion is small, the working time is long and the lifetime
is suitable for application in the Internet of Things (IoT)
network.
3. PLE provides enhanced security at the signal level. PLE
operates in the complex signal domain, unlike traditional
cryptography that only operates in the Boolean algebraic
domain. Therefore, PLE has an enlarged ‘‘operating space’’,
and more functions can be selected, which is conducive to
the design and construction of a more secure encryption
method.
4. PLE can introduce randomness functions that can
be exploited against known plaintext attacks and linear
attacks.
The main methods used in the existing PLE literatures
are constellation rotation, subcarrier disturbance, symbol
scrambling, training symbol reordering and so on. The above
methods are based on the existing constellation modula-
tion, and the output signal still leaks some information
such as modulation. The output signal is not fully con-
fused and may not be able to withstand known-plaintext
attacks (KPAs) and chosen-plaintext attacks (CPAs)
attacks.
In addition, the strict security definition of PLE is still lack-
ing. Precise cryptographic primitive definitions and rigorous
proofs of security are very important for building PLE-based
practical cryptographic protocols. Rigorous proofs of secu-
rity is one of the requirements for PLE schemes to be
standardized.
In this paper, we will concentrate on the general mathe-
matical model and framework of PLE, and consider how to
define and measure the security of PLE. We will establish
the cryptographic primitives of PLE and consider the basic
design rules.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• According to different operating modes, we divide PLE
into two categories: stream PLE and blockPLE. We
will define cryptographic primitives for stream PLE and
block PLE. Then we will give the definition of semantic
security for PLE.
• We will propose design frameworks and the basic rules
of both stream and block PLE.
• We will propose a new PLE function based on isometry
transformation. We will define the isometry transfor-
mation and the stochastic transformation in block PLE.
Isometry transformation can fully confusemultiple sym-
bols while ensuring BER performance.
• In order to resist both KPA and CPA, a practical system
operation mode PLE-block chaining (PBC) is proposed
to enhance practical system security.
• We propose using the information entropy to measure
the information leak and confusion degree of constella-
tions, and propose design principles for the implemen-
tation of PLE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model and security define is given is Section II. The design
framework and rules of PLE are introduced in Section III.
In Section IV, security analysis of KPA and CPA is dis-
cussed. Performance comparison and numerical simulations
are given in Section V. Finally, Section VI summarizes the
conclusions.
Note that this is an extended version of our previous con-
ference paper [20]. The new contributions are summarized as
follows: First, we give a semantic security define for PLE.
Second, detailed proof that the isometry transformation will
not change the bit error ratio (BER) performance of digital
modulation constellations in Section III-B. Third, a practical
system operation mode is proposed in Section III-C. Fourth,
We give some design principles for implementation PLE in
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TABLE 1. Comparison of PLE, PLS and cryptography.
FIGURE 1. Traditional cryptography system model with encoding and
modulation after encryption.
Section III-D. In Section IV, we present a more detailed
security analysis. In addition, we give a design example
and numerical simulations on a practical OFDM system in
Section V.
Notation: XT , X−1, XH and X∗ denote respectively the
transpose, inverse, conjugate transpose and conjugate of
matrix X. IN denotes the N -dimensional identity matrix. |x|
is the absolute value of a complex scalar x. ‖. . .‖ denotes the
Euclidean norm of a vector. Cn represents the space of n× 1
vectors with complex elements.Cm×n andRm×n represent the
space of all m × n matrices with complex elements and real
elements respectively. For sets C andD, C×D = { (c, d) | c ∈
C and d ∈ D }, where × is the Cartesian product between
two sets.
II. PLE SYSTEM MODEL AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC
PRIMITIVE
A. COMPARISON BETWEEN PLE AND A TRADITIONAL
CRYPTOGRAPHY SYSTEM
The main task of PLE and traditional cryptography is design
a mapping from plaintext space to cipher signal space. The
design requirement is that the legal receiver can easily recover
the plaintext from the cipher signal, but the eavesdropper is
infeasible to recover the plaintext. In order to better under-
stand PLE, we compare the differences between PLE and
traditional cryptography.
The structures of traditional cryptography and PLE are
shown in Fig.1. and Fig.2, respectively. Fig.1. is a tradi-
tional cryptography system, where S is a plaintext sequence
and a ciphertext X (binary sequence) is generated by the
encryption algorithm based on the key K , and then sent to
the channel by the coding modulation module. In the tradi-
tional cryptography system, we assumed that the encryption
and decryption blocks experience a perfect channel. Error
correction is guaranteed by the channel encoder/decoder
module.
The system model of PLE is shown in Fig 2, where S̃ is
the recovered plaintext which may contain errors. PLE also
FIGURE 2. PLE communication system model.
FIGURE 3. Stream PLE.
requires keys that needs to be sent from a secret channel
in advance or extracted from wireless channels [21]–[24].
We can see that PLE is essentially a joint design of modu-
lation and encryption. The PLE algorithm not only needs to
consider security, but also needs to consider reliability and
needs to combat the influence of channel and noise. Further,
PLE needs to use the channel error to increase the difficulty
of eavesdropper cracking. Furthermore, PLE deal with the
complex signal which is different form the Boolean algebra
based cryptography.
In Table 1, we summarize the differences between PLE,
PLS, and cryptography. We can see that PLE is different from
PLS and cryptography. We face new problems and need to
propose new rules for PLE.
Then we consider two categories of PLE depending on the
processing mode: Stream PLE and Block PLE.
B. STREAM PLE
Stream PLE uses the transmitted symbol as the basic encryp-
tion unit and can be considered as a time-varying encryption
transform. The structure of stream PLE is shown in Fig.3.,
where P is a pseudorandom complex sequence generation
function, rn is a complex sequence, f is the encryption func-
tion. Stream PLE has the advantage of low latency and low
error propagation. The disadvantages of stream PLE are: dif-
fusion only inside the symbol and there is no overlap between
the symbols. Next we give the detailed process of Stream
PLE.
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1) ENCRYPTION AND MODULATION
The pseudorandom complex sequences rn (where n is the
symbol index) are generated from the key K :
rn = P(K ) = an + jbn = Aneθn . (1)
Here, P is a pseudorandom complex sequence generation
function. The function of rn is used to change the transmitted
symbols, making the output symbols confusing and randomly
distributed. The distribution of rn needs to be designed by the
user.
Definition 1 [Pseudorandom Complex Sequence Genera-
tor (PRCSG)]: Consider ξ a probability distribution on C (a
complex domain). We call a function P : K → Cn (where
K is the set of positive integers) a pseudo-random complex
sequence generator if ∀K ∈ K, P(K ) = {r1, r2, r3 . . .},
where {rn} is a sequence of complex independent random
variables which obeys the ξ distribution.
PRCSG is an algorithm for generating complex random
sequences. But rn is not a true random number because it is
completely determined by the given initial key K.
The encryption function is:
Yn = f (sn, rn). (2)
The output encypted symbol sequence is Y = {Y1,Y2, . . .}
whose nth element is Yn (a complex number), and Yn is a
function of sn and rn. Here, S = {s1, s2, . . .} is the plaintext
binary sequence to be sent. ForM -ary modulation, sn (the nth
element of S) is a log2M -length block of binary bits whose
elements are ‘‘0’’ or ‘‘1’’.
There are two aspects to consider when designing an
encryption function: first, it is easy for Bob (with K ) to
recover S; second, it is infeasible for Eve (without K ) to find
out S.
We will discuss in detail how design f functions in section
III.
2) DEMODULATION AND DECRYPTION
In the PLE system, it is a joint decryption and detection
process, unlike traditional communication systems, where
decryption and detection are two separate processes.
The decryption and demodulation algorithm is denoted as:
S̃ = D(ZB,K ) (3)
where D is the joint decryption and detection algorithm.
When designing D we need to consider both reliability and
complexity.
C. BLOCK PLE
Different from stream PLE, block PLE is only required to
operate on plaintexts of a specific length. Block PLE maps
fixed chunks of bits into complex vector signals. Here the
mapping function can be random. Randomness can be against
CPAs or KPAs.
Block PLE is modeled as a series of functions that map
binary sequences to complex vectors according to the key K :
S = {s1s2 . . . sl}
K
−→ Y = {Y1Y2 . . . YN } (4)
where S is a binary message sequence of length l. K is the kl
bits key, and Y ∈ CN×1 is the cipher signal vector. Different
from stream PLE, l is a fixed large number (for example l=
256 or 512).
F2 is the finite field of two elements and F l2 denotes the
l length vector space elements in F2. Then, the Block PLE
in (4) can be represented as the following mapping T :




Note that T is not necessarily a deterministic function and
it also allows for the introduction of randomness.
We also can consider (5) as a family of functions with one
parameter, and represent it as
Y = TK (S).
The main job for PLE is to design the appropriate func-
tion TK . Since the types of mapping functions are different,
the design of PLE is quite different from traditional cryptog-
raphy. From amathematical point of view, the set of functions
that can be selected is infinite. We have more function types
to choose from and also have a larger key space to combat
brute force.
We need to make the function TK have a pseudo-random
property, i.e., TK (with a randomly-chosen key K ) cannot
be distinguished from and the function of random uniform
selection with the same domain and value range.
D. CHANNEL MODEL
Returning to Fig.2, then after the cipher signal Y passes
through the channel, the symbols received at the legal receiver
and the eavesdropper are respectively: As shown in Fig.2 the
cipher signal Y is transmitted to the wireless channel through
the RF module. We use HB and HE to represent the channel
functions (including the effects of noise) of Bob and Eve,
respectively. The signals received by Bob and Eve are
ZB = HB(Y ) (6)
ZE = HE (Y ). (7)
E. DEFINITIONS OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES OF THE
PLE SYSTEM
Our next work is to establish the cryptographic primitives
of PLE. The cryptographic primitive is the basic unit for
building a secure protocol. Only the definition of a clear
cryptographic primitive can guide the design of PLE and
further apply PLE to the actual security standards.
The cryptographic primitives of PLE is defined as follows:
Definition 2: (Physical Layer Encryption System):
Message space M: the set of all possible plaintext mes-
sages, a finite set. All input messages S ∈M.
Cipher signal space C: the set of all possible ciphers. All
cipher signals Y∈C.
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Key space K,K′: possible encryption key set K, and possi-
ble decryption key set K′. For the symmetric PLE, K=K′.
The encryption keyK is chosen fromK, and the decryption
key K ′ is chosen from K′, and so K ∈ K, K ′ ∈ K′.
Key generation algorithm G : HB→ K ×K′.
G is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs a key pair
(K , K ′) ∈ K × K′ chosen according to the channel HB
between the transmitter and the receiver.
Encryption algorithm T : M ×K→ C.
Channel function HB : C → Z and HE : C → Z
H is the equivalent channel function between cipher signal
Y and received symbol ZB, ZB = HB(Y ). Z is the set of
all possible ZB, and ZB ∈ Z . HE is the channel function of
eavesdropper.
PRCNG: P : K→ Cn.
K is the key set and Cn is a (n× 1) complex vector space;
for stream PLE, complex sequence {rn} = {r1, r2, . . .} ∈ Cn.
Decryption algorithm D : Z ×K′→M.
From the above definition we can see two characteristics
of PLE different from traditional encryption:
1. The cipher signal space is different. The cryptographic
signal space in the PLE is a complex field, which requires us
to design the PLE function of the complex field.
2. The input signal of the decryption algorithm is differ-
ent. In the PLE system, the signal received by the receiver
is affected by noise and channel fading. So the receiving
algorithm is a joint detection and decryption algorithm. The
decoding algorithm needs to meet the following conditions:
Pr(D(HB(TK (S))) = S) ≥ 1− δe (8)
where δe is a given error threshold.




B =(G, T ,D,HB,HE ),
Stream PLE:
∏
S =(G, T ,D,HB,HE ,P).
F. SECURITY DEFINITION
Evaluating the ‘‘security’’ of an encryption scheme is a very
tricky business. The first task is to understand what ‘‘secu-
rity’’ is. There are two types of security. The first one is
Shannon’s definition of perfect security which requires that
the ciphertext contains no information regarding the plain-
text. The second one is semantic security which is based on
computational-complexity. An encryption scheme is seman-
tically secure if it is infeasible to learn anything about the
plaintext from the ciphertext. Infeasible means that Eve can-
not crack within a given computing complexity.
Here we give the definition of semantic security for PLE.
Definition 3 (Indistinguishability of Encryptions):An PLE
scheme
∏
=(G, T ,D,HB,HE ) is (t, ε) message indistin-
guishable, if for every two messages S, S ′, and for every
binary output function DE of complexity ≤ t , we have
|Pr[DE (HE (TK (S))) = 1]− Pr[DE (HE (TK (S ′))) = 1]| ≤ ε,
(9)
where the probability is taken over the randomness of TK (S),
the choice ofK ∈ K and the channelHE . (Typical parameters
that are considered in practice are t = 280 and ε = 2−60.)
In realistic scenarios, Eve may have knowledge of
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. If Eve is able to see encryptions
of arbitrary messages of her choice, she may get some infor-
mation of key or plaintext. An attack in this model is called a
CPA. Now, we will give a security definition under CPA for
PLE.
Definition 4 (Message Indistinguishability Against CPA):
An PLE scheme
∏
= (G, T ,D,HB,HE ) is (t, ε)-message
indistinguishable against CPA if for every two messages S,
S ′ and every DE of complexity ≤ t we have
|Pr[DHE (TK (S))E (HE (TK (S))) = 1]
− Pr[DHE (TK (S))E (HE (TK (S
′))) = 1]| ≤ ε (10)
whereDHE (TK (.))E (HE (TK (S))) means the computation of algo-
rithm DE given HE (TK (S)) as an input and given the ability
to execute HE (TK (.)).
In (9) and (10) HE is a random function that makes the
result of each encryption different even if the plaintext is the
same. This is because the channel is random and we also can
add artificial noise at the transmitter.
III. THE DESIGN FRAMEWORK AND RULES OF PLE
In this section, we will study the design rules and framework
of PLE. There are two aspects to consider when designing the
PLE algorithms.
(i) Reliability
We need to make sure that the legitimate receiver can
recover the received signal correctly and easily.When design-
ing encryption and decryption algorithms, the effects of noise
and channel need to be taken into account. We need to ensure
the maximum constellation distance for better BER perfor-
mance. We also need to consider reducing the complexity of
the receiver.
(ii) Security
The PLE constellation should be diffusing and confusing.
We should effectively use the influence of channel and noise
to increase the difficulty of cracking. The designed PLE
algorithm should be able to resist brute force attacks and
various types of attacks.
In the design of the PLE, reliability and security need
to be considered together. The encryption and decryption
algorithms used in the PLE should not sacrifice bit error rate
performance. The stream PLE and block PLE structures are
quite different, so we will discuss them separately as follows.
A. STREAM PLE DESIGN FRAMEWORK
As shown in Fig.3, the design of the Stream PLE module
consists of two parts. The first part is to design the PRCNG
module. According to Definition 1, we need to generate
a pseudo-random complex sequence that obeys a particu-
lar distribution. This pseudo-random complex sequence is a
deterministic algorithm, and Alice and Bob generate the same
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pseudo-random complex sequence from a short true random
seed (Key). Pseudo-random number generation algorithms
have been studied in many works such as [25].
The second part is the encryption function f in (2).
In streamPLE, the encryption function f maps the input infor-
mation bits into a complex signal (constellation point) accord-
ing to the pseudo-random complex sequence rn. We need to
consider the design of f from both a reliability and security
perspective. Therefore, we use the following two indicators
as the optimization goals of the design f function.
1) MINIMUM CONSTELLATION DISTANCE
d = min
(i,j)i6=j
∣∣f (si, rn)− f (sj, rn)∣∣ (11)
where si, sj ∈ M are possible input messages and d is the
minimum distance between two different constellations. Like
the traditional constellation design, d determines the error
probability at the receiver. So our design goal is to maximize
d to minimize BER.
2) CONFUSION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OUTPUT SIGNAL
Note that if rn is truly random, then this forms a one-time
system which provides perfect security. However, in a prac-
tical system, we cannot get a truly random rn from a limited
length key. So rn is a pseudorandom complex sequence and
not truly random. Therefore, eavesdroppers have the possibil-
ity of obtaining information about si or rn by accumulating
observations for Y over a long time. In order to avoid this
situation, we need more confusion in the y-sequence, and
there are more possible values for y = a+ jb.
We use the continuous entropy to measure the confusion
degree of Y as follows:
H (Y ) = −
∞∫∫
−∞
p(a, b) log2 p(a, b)dadb, (12)
where p(a, b) is the joint probability density function for a
and b.
Since continuous entropy is infinite, it is not easy to cal-
culate the continuous entropy values. In addition, the actual
digital system will quantize the signal Y , so we will use
discrete source entropy to measure the confusion degree of
Y . A continuous Y is discretized into bins of size 1 (we
can understand it as quantization accuracy). We thus have
quantized entropy as:





Γ (i, j) log2 Γ (i, j), (13)





We need to maximize H1(Y ), given the domain
of Y is C. According to maximum entropy theory, Y needs
to be a uniform distribution within its given domain C [26].
This rule means that for an arbitrary input symbol S, after the
f -function transformation, Y can be any value in the entire
given domain, and the probability of different values is equal.
According to the above two criteria, we present two design
routes for encryption functions.
(i) PLE based on traditional modulation
The first design idea is implemented by transforming on
the traditional constellation (BPSK,QAM, etc.). We just need
to design the transform function for encryption and decryp-
tion. The transform function needs to confuse the constella-
tion as much as possible. In addition, in order not to change
the BER performance of the original constellation, we need
to ensure that the transformation function does not change the
distance of the constellation points.
In a phase modulation system (QPSK, BPSK, M-PSK,
etc.), a straightforward method is constellation rotation.
A random complex signal e−jθn (θ ∼ U [0, 2π ], uniform
distribution) is generated by the PRCSG module, and then
multiplied by the original constellation to obtain an encrypted
constellation. The encryption process is as follows:
Yn = Xne−jθn . (14)
Obviously, the transformation in (14) does not change the
constellation distance. This method is used in [27] and [14].
In [27], three candidate PLE methods based on traditional
modulation are proposed and compared. The phase rotation
method depends on the phase information shared by both
Alice and Bob. The phase information can be extracted from
the reciprocal channel or transmitted by a secure channel. The
eavesdropper does not know this phase information.
In the amplitude and phasemodulation system (e.g.,QAM),
both the phase and amplitude information needs to be pro-
tected. Only phase rotation will leak the amplitude informa-
tion. Therefore, we propose a disturbance-rotation method as
follows.
First, the input symbol sn is scrambled to obtain s′n. This
scramble operator destroys the correspondence relationship
between the amplitude information and the number of bits.
Take 16QAM as an example, the information symbol is
sn = {b1b2b3b4}. First, we change the order of the bits
according to the pseudorandom number given by the random
generator, and get s′n = {ba1ba2ba3ba4}, where {a1, a2, a3, a4}
is a permutation of {1, 2, 3, 4}. Here there are 4! = 24 kinds of
possible permutations. Then, we perform 16QAM mapping
to get Xn. Finally we use the rotation operation as (14) The
final constellation is now shown in Fig.4.
(ii) New constellation for stream PLE
Another effective method is to design a new PLE constel-
lation. This makes the constellation diagram have better con-
fusing characteristics, which can resist brute force cracking.
For example, a 3-dimensional rotated constellation mod-
ulation was proposed in our previous work [28]. We map
each 2-bits message to a 3-dimensional constellation point
and evenly distributed on the spherical surface. The
3-dimensional constellation points occupy 3 real channels
in the practical system. For example, in an OFDM sys-
tem, we combine 1.5 subcarriers as one modulation unit
for three-dimensional mapping. The detailed process is as
follows:
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FIGURE 4. PLE for QPSK and 16QAM systems.
First, we map each 2-bit message sn into the vertex coor-
dinates of a regular tetrahedron {V1,V2,V3,V4} according to
equation (15), as shown in Fig. 5, where Xn ∈ R3.
Xn =

V1 if sn = 00
V2 if sn = 01
V3 if sn = 11
V4 if sn = 10.
(15)
The regular tetrahedron constellation has better energy effi-
ciency.














V4 = (0, 0, 1) (16)
Next, we use three-dimensional rotation to disturb the
constellation for security.
Yn = R(α, β, γ ) · Xn (17)
where Yn ∈ R3, R(α, β, γ ) ∈ R3×3 is the rotation matrix and
α, β, γ ∼ U (0, 2π ) are phase parameters. R(α, β, γ ) is given
by (18) and (19), as shown at the bottom of the next page.
The distribution of Yn is shown in the Fig.5. These con-
stellation points (Yn) are distributed on the surface of the unit
sphere with centroid at the origin.
B. BLOCK PLE DESIGN FRAMEWORK
The operating unit of the Block PLE is a fixed-length binary
sequence. Unlike the traditional block cipher, block PLE
converts bit blocks to complex vectors. The rules of Block
FIGURE 5. PLE for a 3-D constellation where constellation points lie on
the surface of the sphere with a uniform probability density function for
each of the two parametric angles.
PLE is different from upper layer block cipher. Traditional
Block cipher is faced with an ideal noise-free channel (as
show in Fig. 1, the error has been removed by the channel
coding and modulate module). The Block PLE is faced with
a channel with noise and channel fading as show in Fig. 2. It is
designed not only to take into account the security but also to
take into account the reliability. So the Block PLE design is
a joint design of communication and encryption.
The design of block PLE needs to consider the following
three aspects.
(i) Confusion
The relationship between the key and the cipher signal
is very complicated and there is no clear correspondence.
A small change in the key will make the cipher signal com-
pletely different. Even if the eavesdropper has a large amount
of cipher signal, the key cannot be analyzed.
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FIGURE 6. Block PLE.
(ii) Diffusion
We should make the statistical structure of the plaintext
dissipate over the entire cryptographic signal. The corre-
spondence between plaintext and cipher signals should be
disturbed and complicated as much as possible. The diffusion
feature is designed to prevent differential attacks. Note that
this is a little different from the diffusion concept in tradi-
tional bit-level encryption. In traditional bit-level encryption,
changing one bit of plaintext will make the cipher text totally
different. However in PLE, due to channel noise, we should
ensure that the distances between the plaintext codes do not
change after encryption to guarantee the bit error rate of the
legal receiver.
(iii) Noise tolerance
Since the cipher signal passes through thewireless channel.
The receiver needs to recover themessage from the cipher sig-
nal containing noise. Therefore, the design of the encryption
and decryption functions should not amplify the noise.
Fig. 6 is the structure of block PLE. The key schedule is
an algorithm that extends a short master key K to three dif-
ferent extended keys (K1,K2,K3) for the following three PLE
stages [29]. The three stages are: Bit Change,Modulation and
Block Change.
The purpose of the bit change stage is to disturb and con-
fuse binary sequences. We can use Boolean operations such
as interleaving, replacement,permutation, etc. [30], [31]. The
binary vector S is changed to S′ according to K1.




2 . . . s
′
l} → X = {X1X2 . . .XN },
where {s′1s
′
2 . . . s
′
l} are binary numbers, and X ∈ C
N is the
output of the modulation. l is the bits length and N is the
symbol number. For M -ary constellation, l = N log2M .
Block change is the most important step in the PLE.
Its function is to make the symbols interlace and confuse,
so that the eavesdropper can not recover the original signal.
Essentially, it is a mapping function e between two complex
vector spaces:
X = {X1X2 . . .XN } → Y = {Y1Y2 . . . YN } (20)
Y = e(X) (21)
where Y ∈ CN is the cipher signal vector. We can design
multiple sub-transforms e1, e2, e3 . . . and then combine them
to form e.
e(X) = e1(e2(. . . (en(X)))). (22)
We provide three types of transforms for PLE, which are
isometry transformation, stochastic transformation and non-
linear transformations.
1) ISOMETRY TRANSFORMATION
In order to make the distance of the constellation points not
change, we use the definition of isometry.
Definition 5: Let X and Y be metric spaces with met-
rics dX and dY : A map f : X → Y is called an isometry
or distance preserving if for any a, b∈X one has
dY (f (a), f (b)) = dX (a, b). (23)
Then X and Y are Euclidean spaces of the same dimension
N , and all the isometries between X and Y can be denoted by
premultiplying X with a unitary matrix U ∈ CN where
UUH = UHU = IN . (24)
Obviously |det(U)| = 1. The columns or rows of U
form an orthonormal basis of CN with respect to the usual
inner product. In fact any N × N unitary matrix U has N 2
independent real phase parameters. Thus, we can generate an
N×N unitary matrixU from a given rotation direction vector,
8 ∈ RN 2 . 8 can be generated from K3 (see Fig. 6), and both
are known by both Alice and Bob. The method of generation
of an N × N unitary matrix from 8 is given in [32].
Taking N = 2 as an example then the general expression
for an 2× 2 unitary matrix is:
U = eiφ/2
[
eiφ1 cos θ eiφ2 sin θ
−e−iφ2 sin θ e−iφ1 cos θ
]
, (25)
which depends on 4 parameters 8 = {φ, φ1, φ2, θ} , where
φ, φ1, φ2, θ ∈ [0, 2π ].
Thus ei(X) = UX (see (22) for ei(X)) can be used as a sub-
transformation. We can also extend to N > 2 to acquire more
confusion.
Theorem 6: For any M-ary constellation diagram S =
{S1,S2, . . . ,SM} , an isometry transformation e(. . .) on S
R(α, β, γ ) =
 cos γ sin γ 0− sin γ cos γ 0
0 0 1
1 0 00 cosβ sinβ
0 − sinβ cosβ
 cosα 0 sinα0 1 0
− sinα 0 cosα
 (18)
=
 cosα cos γ − cosβ sinα sin γ sinα cos γ + cosβ cosα sin γ sinβ sin γ− cosα sin γ − cosβ sinα cos γ − sinα sin γ + cosβ cosα cos γ sinβ cos γ
sinβ sinα − sinβ cosα cosβ
 (19)
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does not change its average demodulation BER performance
under Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channels.
Proof: We assume that after isometry transformation,
the constellation diagram turns into Y = {Y1,Y2, . . . ,YM }.
According to Definition 1, for any i, j ≤ M , we have∥∥Si − Sj∥∥ = ∥∥Yi − Yj∥∥.
We assume the channel output of the S system and the Y
system are r = Si + n1 and r̃ = Yi + n2 respectively, where
n1 and n2 are i.i.d. Gaussian noise vectors.
The maximum likelihood (ML) receivers of constellation
diagram S and Y are
argmin
Si
‖r − Si‖ and argmin
Yi
‖r̃− Yi‖ .
The Si and Yi (i = 1, . . . sM ) are determined from the
decision regions:
Zi= (r : ||r−Si||< ||r−Sj||,∀j = 1, . . . ,M , j 6= i) (26)
Z̃i= (r̃ : ||r̃−Yi||r̃−Yj||,∀j = 1, . . . ,M , j 6= i). (27)
According to Definition 3, for any r we have∥∥r − Sj∥∥ = ∥∥r̃− Yj∥∥ , (j = 1, . . . ,M ) (28)
Thus according to (26), (27) and (28), Zi and Z̃i are in one-
to-one correspondence.
The error probability of the ML receiver of constellation












p(r ∈ Zi|Sisent), (29)
and
P̃e = 1− 1/M
M∑
i=1
p(r̃ ∈ Z̃i|Yisent). (30)
Due to Zi and Z̃i being in one-to-one correspondence, Pe =
P̃e, so the two constellation diagrams S and Y have the same
demodulation performance.
Although the above proof assumes an AWGN channel,
the simulations section shows that the conclusions are also
correct under multipath fading channels.
The phase rotation scheme, which has been used









where φ1φ2 . . . φN ∈ [0, 2π ] are taken as keys. Multiplying
a vector by this matrix means that each element of the vector
rotates at different angles φ1φ2 . . . φN ∈ [0, 2π ].
However, it is not safe to use only phase rotation, which
cannot resist known-plaintext attacks. We will analyze this
issue in the section IV.C.2.
2) STOCHASTIC TRANSFORMATION
If the eavesdropper can obtain a large number of plain-
text cipher signal pairs, then it can perform known-plaintext
attacks or statistical analysis attacks. To combat these attacks,
we should introduce a random transformation. The stochastic
transformation makes the cipher signal different even if the
plaintext is the same. A simple example of stochastic map-
ping is to add some restricted artificial noise.
3) NONLINEAR TRANSFORMATIONS
Ordinary non-linear transformations will amplify the effects
of noise. So squared functions and exponential functions
cannot be applied directly to PLE systems. However, we can
consider a system under low noise, and using some special
non-linear transformations we will have a more secure effect.
The purpose of these transformations is to make each
input bit dispersed into the entire output signal block, and
to make the output signal confusing, while ensuring that the
BER performance of the system does not decrease. Similar
to stream PLE, we can still use the quantized information
entropy of the constellation as in (13) to measure the degree
of confusion in the overall Block PLE system.
C. BLOCK PLE MODE OF PRACTICAL OPERATION
Block PLE by itself is only suitable for the secure trans-
formation of one fixed-length group of bits called a block.
In order to securely transform amounts of data larger than a
block, we also need to design the mode of operation for block
PLE. A mode of operation describes how to repeatedly apply
a block PLE single-block operation. In this section we will
introduce a natural and simple operation mode called Elec-
tronic Codebook (ECB). We then propose a new operation
mode PLE-block chaining (PBC).
1) ELECTRONIC CODEBOOK (ECB)
A simple encryption mode is the Electronic Codebook (ECB)
mode as shown in Fig.7. The messages that need to be
encrypted are divided into blocks according to the block
size of the block cipher, and each block is independently
encrypted. The disadvantage of this method is that the same
plaintext block is encrypted into the same cipher signal block.
Therefore, it does not hide data patterns well and can be easily
cryptanalyzed.
2) PLE-BLOCK CHAINING (PBC)
Inspired by the Cipher-block chaining(CBC) model [34],
we proposed the PLE-block chaining mode. In PBC mode,
as shown in Fig.8 each plaintext block is XORed with the
bit change output S ′ from the previous PLE block and then
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FIGURE 7. Electronic Codebook (ECB).
FIGURE 8. PLE-block chaining (PBC).
encrypted by PLE. In this method, each cipher signal block
depends on all plaintext blocks in front of it. At the same time,
in order to ensure the uniqueness of each message, you need
to use the initialization vector in the first block.
D. DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR IMPLEMENTATION PLE
A good PLE should be hard to break and easy to imple-
ment. Both the encryption function and the decoding function
should be easily computable. PLE is usually implemented in
hardware, such as a VLSI-chip. To reduce complexity and
make it easier to standardize, the following design principles
are required:
1) Independence and universality:Design PLE as a sep-
arate module embedded in the communication system
that can be applied to various types of communication
systems and modulation types.
2) Robustness and effectiveness: The performance of
the communication system should not be reduced by
PLE, including synchronization performance, channel
estimation performance, spectrum efficiency, energy
efficiency, etc. And low latency is also important.
3) Protection of the communications system: In addi-
tion to protecting data, PLEs can also be designed to
protect training symbols so that eavesdroppers can-
not perform channel estimation and synchronization,
thereby achieving stronger security effects.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In this section we will discuss the security of the PLE system.
We also use Kerckhoff’s assumption: the enemy knows all
details of the system except for the value of the secret key.
A. EAVESDROPPER MODEL
Assume that Eve has the following capabilities:
• Eve can accurately estimate the channel functions HB(.)
and HE (.).
• Eve knows the encryption function f and decryption
function D, but does not know the secret key K .
Eve may use the following attack methods:
• Eve only knows ZnE and try to decode S or recover K
(ciphertext-only attack).
• Eve knows the plaintext S and its corresponding
ciphertext signal ZnE , and attempts to recover K (
known-plaintext attack).
• Eve can obtain the cipher signal for any specified plain-
texts for the current key, and attempts to recover K
(chosen-plaintext attack).
The PLE algorithm we designed needs to be able to resist
the above attacks. From equation (7), we can see that even
with the same transmission symbol S and the same keyK , due
to noise and influence of the channel, at different transmission
timings the results ZE obtained will be different. S and ZE
does not show a one-to-one correspondence, which makes
eavesdropper cryptanalysis methods such as linear attacks
and differential analysis more difficult.
B. STREAM PLE SECURITY DISCUSSION
First, we analyze the signals received by eavesdropper,
ZnE = HE (yn) = HE (f (sn, rn)).
The security of the stream PLE system is mainly guaranteed
by the pseudorandom complex sequence rn and the encryp-
tion function f . Therefore, the security features that need to
be considered during design are as follows:
1. We need the autocorrelation function of rn to have a
distinct peak, and the period of the rn sequence should be
longer than the lifetime of the key.
2. The design of the function yn = f (sn, rn) should make
the output signal yn uniformly and randomly distributed. Its
distribution characteristics are not affected by the input signal
sn, and the eavesdropper cannot perform statistical analysis
from the received signals.
Shannon proved in theory that the one-time pad cipher is
perfectly secure in the ciphertext-only scenario. But how to
generate the pseudorandom complex sequence rn which is
close to the completely random sequences becomes the key
point.
In the stream PLE, the PRCS and the plaintext message are
independent of each other. The internal state of the stream is
only dependent on the internal state of the last time interval
and is not related to the input plaintext. The advantage of the
synchronization stream PLE is its limited error propagation.
When the transmission error occurs in a symbol, it does not
affect the subsequent symbol.
For the known plaintext attack, the attacker can only cal-
culate the pseudorandom complex number ri at the current
time. This is because there is no periodicity or the periodicity
is longer than the key lifetime, and there is no correlation
with other time intervals. So eavesdroppers cannot get keys
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or other plaintext. A well-designed stream PLE can withstand
known plaintext attacks.
C. BLOCK PLE SECURITY DISCUSSION
1) KEY SPACE
Security in block PLE is mainly provided by Bit change and
Block change. We assume a PLE scheme that maps l bit
data into N constellation symbols as in (5). For a block PLE
to be secure, its block length l and key size kl must both
be large enough to deter statistical analysis and make the
exhaustive key search attack infeasible. In order to facilitate
the communication system, N can often be designed as a
physical layer signal unit such as the frame length. Since
the cipher signal space CN is a complex space with infinite
values, the available key space is almost infinite. In a practical
system, we can choose the corresponding key length accord-
ing to our needs.
Taking the IEEE 802.16 standard OFDM signal as an
example, in a 256-point FFT system, 192 subcarriers carry
signals and QPSK modulation is used. Thus, l = 384, N =
192, and so we can set the key length to 256. Then the key
space is 2256. So, brute-force attack is practically impossible
for block PLE.
2) KNOWN PLAINTEXT ATTACK AND CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT
ATTACK
In order to combat KPA and CPA, we need to design the
encryption function e(x) which make Eve cannot recover K
from the accumulated large number of plaintext-cipher signal
pairs. We consider the worst case that the noise received by
Eve is very small and can be ignored. Thus, We assume that
Eve can get Y accurately.
In the phase rotation method [14], [17], [19], each symbol
is encrypted separately, Un,Xn,Yn ∈ C. Thus, we have
Yn = e(Xn) = UnXn.
If the eavesdropper knowsXn and Yn, it can solveUn = Yn/Xn
and calculate the key K from Un. So just using phase rotation
is not enough to resist KPA and CPA.
In our proposed Block PLE frame, the signal is encrypted
as a group. The unitary matrix U defined in the isometry
transformation has N × N matrix elements, so Eve cannot
solve equation YN×1 = UN×NXN×1 to obtain U. Moreover,
Uwill change between different symbols which is guaranteed
by PLE-block chaining (PBC) as is shown in Fig.8. Thus, Eve
cannot obtain U by accumulating a certain amount of both Y
and X.
V. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON AND NUMERICAL
SIMULATIONS
A. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT PLE
SCHEMES
To compare the performance of PLE, we considered
five PLE algorithms: phase rotation scheme [14], [17], [19],
intrinsic interference scheme [12], sub-carrier obfuscate
FIGURE 9. The constellation received by Bob and Eve, QPSK and 16QAM,
isometry based block PLE OFDM system, SNR=16dB, SUI 1 channel [35].
and dummy [11], the proposed isometry based block PLE
scheme, and the proposed stream PLE framework. We eval-
uate algorithm performance from five perspectives: a) BER
penalty, reduced BER performance compared to unencrypted
systems; b) throughput decrease; c) key space; d) CPA secu-
rity, the ability to prevent CPA; e) encryption and decryption
complexity.
As shown in Table 2, the proposed PLE methods has
advantages over other PLE methods. In the previous section
we proved that PLE methods that only uses phase rotation
cannot fight CPA. The intrinsic interference scheme and
the dummy based scheme use some transmission power to
send imaginary symbols or dummy data, so their BER or
throughput performances decrease. Note that in the subcarrier
obfuscate and dummy scheme two stream ciphers are used,
so the CPA security depends on the stream cipher it chooses.
Also, the CPA security of the stream PLE framework depends
on PRCNG.
We also consider complexity of all the schemes. In the
isometry based block PLE scheme, the main added compu-
tational complexity is N × N complex matrix multiplication
which is has mature method for hardware implementation.
Here, n is the plaintext length. It is shown that all five PLE
schemes have linear complexity that can be realized by soft-
ware or hardware implementation.
B. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS ON A PRACTICAL
OFDM SYSTEM
The performance of the proposed isometry based block PLE
scheme is evaluated through numerical simulations. The sim-
ulation is based on the physical layer of IEEE 802.11ac
OFDM protocol which has been widely used in a wireless
local area network. We consider the 256-point FFT with a
cyclic prefix length of 1/4 of FFT length. The parameters are:
QPSK and 16QAM modulation, DFT size = 256, a cyclic
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TABLE 2. Performance comparison of different PLE schemes.
FIGURE 10. Information entropy of constellation.
prefix length = 64. We evaluate the BER performance over
practical frequency selective fading channel SUImodels [35].
Fig.9 shows the constellation received by Bob (after
decryption recovery) and Eve. As an example, we consider
QPSK and 16QAMmodulation, the proposed isometry based
block PLE OFDM system, SNR = 16 dB. We can see that
the constellation symbols received by Eve are approximately
uniformly distributed randomly within the given domain
under the effects of isometry transformation, while Bob can
recover the constellation correctly. Note that in a 16QAM
modulation system, the amplitude information is protected in
our proposed method. However, the phase rotation scheme
in [14], [17], [19] leaks the amplitude information in the
16QAM system as shown in Fig.4.
FIGURE 11. BERs of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper in an
OFDM system.
In order to measure the information leak and confusion
degree of constellations, we calculate the information entropy
of constellations according to (13). The bigger the entropy
is, the more uncertainty the constellation information is,
and the less leak information the constellation has. We con-
sider different quantization length (i.e. bits/sample). Fig.10
shows that the information entropy increases with increasing
quantization length of constellation coordinates. It is shown
that our proposed isometry based method outperforms other
methods, and can resist the attacks based on the information
entropy.
Then, we evaluate the BERs of the legitimate user and the
eavesdropper under an AWGN channel and a SUI channel.
In Fig.11, we considered four situations: AWGN channel
with no encryption, AWGN channel with PLE, SUI channel
with no encryption, and SUI channel with PLE. We can see
that in PLE system the eavesdropper’s BERs are very close
to 0.5. It means that no information is leaked. Simulation
also shows that our proposed isometry method nearly has the
sameBER as the non-encrypted system under both anAWGN
channel and a fading channel. These simulation results are
consistent with the Theorem 2 in section III.B which means
that the isometry transformation does not affect the BER
performance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed a general mathematical model and
cryptography primitive of PLE. Different from traditional
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cryptography, PLE is essentially a function design from a
binary bit domain to a complex domain. Most of its oper-
ations are performed in the complex domain. We defined
semantic security for PLE. PLE is divided into two categories:
stream PLE and block PLE. The design frameworks and
guidelines for stream PLE and block PLE are proposed. For
block PLE, we proposed three types of sub-transforms: isom-
etry transformation, stochastic transformation and nonlinear
transformation. We further proposed a new mode PLE-block
chaining to resist CPA and KPA. Compared with traditional
cryptography, PLE is still a new field to be explored and
studied, which has more cryptographic signal space and key
space. Our proposed PLE framework provides more freedom
of design and is resistant to KPA and CPA. Simulation shows
that the proposed isometry transformation method has good
performances in terms of BER penalty and confusion degree.
In future research, we will consider the impact of the
error correction mechanism such as ARQ and FEC on the
PLE. In addition, non-linear transformations provide better
security to confront cryptanalysis. Whether or not there are
non-linear transformations that guarantee the performance of
the constellation is also a problem. Asymmetric PLE which
does not need to perform key distribution on a private channel
can also be cast into a similar framework. The detailed inves-
tigation of such framework is beyond the scope of this article
and is deferred for the future study.
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